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  • #31
    MR. MACGRATH: I told him in no circumstances was he to publish them; I reported this matter then to the chiefs on this side of the House and we took particular precaution and sent two men to the Press—the Freeman and Independent—to tell them under no circumstances were they to be published.

    THE SPEAKER: Well it is understood that these documents and notes of that Committee which met in private are confidential.

    MR. MACENTEE: I presume that the publication of these documents will be regarded by this House as a breach of privilege, and that if they will be published——

    MR. HOGAN: I have been listening for five minutes to the debate which went on on the assumption that some of the Committee are trying underhand methods to get out these things—that somebody is trying to get out documents which are confidential. Is that a fair statement?

    THE SPEAKER: That statement has not been made.

    MR. HOGAN: I say on behalf of this side of the Committee that we are doing our best to the contrary.

    PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I never made any remarks of the kind. I would have kept silent on it were it not for the remark of the Deputy for Longford that they went down on their knees to get unity.

    MR. MACGUINNESS: To anybody who was present yesterday it will be clear that what I have said is absolutely true.

    The House adjourned at 1.40 p.m.

    The Dáil Eireann Session was resumed at 4.10 p.m. on Saturday, 7th January, 1922, with THE SPEAKER (DR. MACNEILL) in the Chair.

    MR. LIAM MELLOWES: On a point of information, there is a notice of motion here by Doctor MacNeill. Is that in order?

    THE SPEAKER: In order? Well, it is.

    MR. LIAM MELLOWES: Should we not get twenty-four hours' notice?

    [320]THE SPEAKER: It is not put before you yet. Very likely you will have forty-eight hours' notice of it.

    MADAME MARKIEVICZ: Is that a vote of confidence by the people who are voting for Saorstát na hEireann?

    THE SPEAKER: It can't be discussed now.

    At the request of the Speaker the Secretary, Mr. Diarmuid O'Hegarty, called the roll, when 122 members answered.

    MR. DANIEL CORKERY: I rise to vote against this Treaty; I believe if I voted for this Treaty I would be voting against the independence of my country; I am not prepared to do that. I believe, also, if we go into this British Empire we will go in there as a prop to hold up a rotten Empire. We have heard a lot here of the alternative to this Treaty— terrible and immediate war. Well, I have the honour of representing Mid-Cork in this Dáil, and I think this guerilla warfare was started in Mid.-Cork; I believe the first lorry was attacked in Mid.-Cork; the people have been with us all the time up to the Truce and they never flinched though they often heard the angry crack of the rifle and machine gun. The people down there do not want war, but they are not half as much afraid of war as the people from other counties who have not fired a shot yet. I am against this Treaty.

    MR. JOSEPH MACGUINNESS: I am sorry to admit that I have lost; this was the shortest speech yet.
    Such is life - Ned Kelly

    Comment


    • #32
      MR. P.J. WARD: All through this long debate I have listened to the arguments on every side and, as one who has risen for the first time to speak in this assembly, I wish to state the reasons why I am going to vote for the approval of the Treaty; not because I hope to convert even any one Deputy here, but for the purpose of explaining to my constituents the reason for my action. I am in the position of one of the Deputies who spoke before lunch—Deputy O'Rourke; and I make no apology whatever to any man for changing my opinions. I came here to this assembly opposed to this Treaty, as I believed then that the Dáil, by a big majority, would be opposed to it. It was not what we were fighting for; it was not the end the ultimate end—of what I had in view when I joined Sinn Féin; but, as I have said, I have listened here without interrupting any man, and I have formed my opinion from what I have heard, and from what I know are the facts of the situation. I have not been impressed by anybody on either side; nor has my opinion been formed for me; I have formed it myself. Now, I was opposed to the Treaty because it was not the thing for which we were fighting. I have heard a lot here about the Republic as if it were not acutally existing; about what we fought for; and I have heard from various members that this Treaty gave us what we fought for. I don't agree with that. The election of 1918 may have been for self-determination; but when I stood for the election I had to fight a bitter one; I stood for the complete independence of this country—total separation from England—and the placards are still on the walls down in Tír Chonaill. It was not for self-determination I fought the election, it was for independence; and it will come to pass yet that the Irish people, if given a free choice, will vote for independence. Now, the fight was begun then, or in 1916, if you will; it has gone on since; we have had only one thing before us and that is the independence of this country—complete and total separation. The Republic was set up here in 1919; but we had not independence although the Republic was set up; we were fighting for it; and that fight is going on yet, and will go on in the future. Now, this Treaty was signed; but how it was signed, or by what means it was signed, is a matter with which I have nothing to do. It is here before us; and we have not to judge of this Treaty by how or why or the manner in which the signature was obtained; we have to deal with facts, with the facts of the situation as they are at the present moment. I believed when I came to this Dáil, and I believe it now, that if this Treaty had been rejected practically unanimously by the Dáil we could have obtained unity in this country and have the people behind us, and we could have won our case. I was opposed to the Treaty up to Christmas; I went down to my constituency, and I may say here that I know my constituents perhaps as well as any other man in the Dáil; I have [321] travelled throughout the length and breadth of my constituency; and I have been in practically every Sinn Féin Club during the two months before this Treaty was signed—we have twenty-four of them. At Christmas every Sinn Féin Club debated this Treaty amongst themselves; I went to the Comhairle Ceanntair and I endeavoured there—because I wanted to save them from themselves—to prevent them passing a resolution against acceptance; and the Sinn Féin Clubs, by seventeen to three, asked that this Treaty be ratified under protest; and they stated that they could see no alternative. Now, that was the voice of my constituency; it was the voice of the best elements in that constituency. I will not speak of what the army thinks—I know that the army is prepared to fight as before—for it is the civil population that decides this question now; and of the civil population that is the voice, and the answer they gave to me. Now, I told them there at that Comhairle Ceanntair meeting that I did not hold that I was necessarily bound to vote for the ratification, because I held that the mandate they gave me was to secure the independence of Ireland, and that if I thought it better and wiser to vote against this Treaty I would do so; but what I did pledge myself to was this: that I would vote at this meeting of the Dáil for what I thought was the best way to obtain that independence of Ireland for which we were fighting. Now, those people down the country, so far as I can understand, can see no alternative but to take this Treaty as a step—that is their voice. I have not met one man who was in favour of the Treaty but was in favour of it only as a step to the independence to which we were making. I have met some that were against it, as I have told you, but the majority were in favour of it as a step towards that independence because they could see no other way out of it. As I said, I could have seen the other way out when I came to this Dáil, if this Dáil had made up its mind to stand for it; but now, when it has come to the final day for decision I have to make up my mind as to the wisest course and the best way to obtain the independence of my country. Now, we have heard here members talk of an alternative to rejection; some have told me privately that they based their decision on the belief that Lloyd George would not go to war with the Irish nation; I do not know what grounds they have for that view; I can only form my own opinion on English politics and one point in that matter is this: I do not know that any change has come to England since after that final note came before the Dáil for its approval— when the answer was being sent back to England that we would not accept her terms we were told that rejection of them would mean immediate war. I am not aware that any change has taken place since in Lloyd George's mind so that the rejection of this offer might not mean war, too; I do know that it has been said here that at that Session the members of the Dáil, when they let the plenipotentiares go to England, compromised. I only asked one question on that occasion; I asked the President what he meant by association with the British Commonwealth of nations in his letter to Lloyd George, and I did not receive any direct reply. Even if this Treaty were rejected, and the President's document accepted by Lloyd George, I hold there will not be a lasting peace with England until we are absolutely separated from England and the British Empire. Now, the probable consequences of rejection have a different light in every Deputy's mind here, I suppose; but in my mind the consequences, if the Treaty be rejected, are that now Lloyd George is in the position of knowing that this country is absolutely disunited, and that he is in the happy position of knowing that if he makes war now—if he only threatens war on this country—that the people of this country do not want to fight. I know that may not be as it appears to you; but I have talked with the people, and I know their minds, and I know the view point they have; they are war-worn; they have come through a strenuous fight and they want peace. Now they see the prospect of peace, and they have not the smallest scruple about it; they are willing to take that prospect; and they, at the same time, are willing to take it as a stepping stone. I have no scruples about it either; I am willing to take it as a stepping stone, and I do not care how Lloyd George views what Deputies say here; so far as I am concerned, I will only vote for this Treaty as a stepping stone to put this country into such a position at some future time—[322] when the opportunity does come—that it will claim the total separation that it is entitled to as a separate nation. Some members have said that this Treaty should be put to the people of this country whichever way it goes, and some even have said that, so far as their constituents are concerned, their constituents would support them in its rejection. I do not know about their constituents; so far as my own constituency is concerned, I have men there who are opposed to the Treaty, and I am glad these men are there; perhaps if I were in their place I would be opposed to this Treaty; but I am here with the responsibility of either accepting this Treaty or rejecting it, with the consequences to the country. What these consequences are is in the future; you may see them in one light, I may see them in the other; but I will not take the responsibility of rejecting this Treaty with the probable consequences to the country, because one thing that may happen if this Treaty is rejected is this, and I regard it as the worst: we have got certain things here from Lloyd George and from the British Government in this Treaty which, if utilised to the full force, will benefit this country; but if this Treaty is rejected that gives Lloyd George an opportunity of backing down from these terms. Now, there are things in it that are not palatable to us and not palatable to Lloyd George and his associates, and they would be only too anxious and too glad to get rid of all this; and then, when he has an opportunity of backing out from the Treaty he has signed, he can put worse terms before the people of this country; and what I say is this, that the people of this country, in the state in which they are in at present, would take worse terms. You may like that or you may not. It is because the people of this country are disunited, because they have expressed their views on this Treaty, that I am voting for the Treaty. I do not want the Treaty myself; I do not like it; but I know very well that you will not be able to wring anything more out of Lloyd George with the state the people are in now in the country; you will wring no more, and you will have to take less. The other consequences are that you will go on in this state for years to come before you get as far as you are at present.
      Such is life - Ned Kelly

      Comment


      • #33
        Now, I have said nothing personal on one side or the other; I regard it as disastrous that there should have been such a split in the Dáil; if there had been unanimity the situation could have been saved. However, that is my own opinion. I make this explanation for the purpose of explaining to my constituents why I vote in this way, because some of them know I was opposed to it, and strongly opposed to it, when the Treaty came out first; I do consider that this Treaty, if it ever comes into operation, will give a chance to the people at some future time to obtain full independence. Now, I won't detain you very much longer. I am a lawyer, but I do not think I have employed any argument on this, or legal quibbles, or constitutional law; and I think if the lawyers who did speak first were to speak now they would not use these arguments either, for this matter is too big for chess-playing. We have to swallow a bitter pill in this; one Deputy has said that to-day, and nobody likes to swallow pills; but if we honestly think that it is for the best interests of our country I think we are doing then what our conscience directs; and in taking this step I consider I am doing what is best for my country. I will vote for the Treaty under protest— not under protest in a sense, because I have a free will—but I will vote for it only as a stepping stone, and when the time comes I will be just as ready to take a part in the fight for independence as I have been in the past. After all, we here are split, as far as I can see, on which is the better way; that is the only thing that divides us. I told my Comhairle Ceanntair that I would vote for what I thought was the best way to gain absolute independence in the end; I consider that if I voted for rejection I would be putting back the fight for independence for years and years to come; whereas if I vote and swallow the pill and take the Treaty I consider that I will bring that absolute independence nearer by years; how many years I do not know. I do know, however, that the people of this country have not changed their national aspirations, and I consider that their national aspirations will be brought nearer by acceptance of the Treaty.

        MR. JOSEPH O'DOHERTY: When I read the terms of the Treaty signed in London everything that was in me that I can call good revolted against those [323] terms. Like my co-Deputy from Tír Chonaill I came to this Session of Dáil Eireann with a mind that was open to conviction against these prejudices that I had; no argument that has been produced by those who are for this Treaty has made any influence on me; I see in it the giving away of the whole case of Irish independence; I see in it, not the coming nearer of the day when liberty will be throughout the land, but the going farther away from that day; and I can't be a coward, and I would be a coward if I said anything else; and I can't be on the side of those who are swallowing pills and taking the backward step in the hope that in the near future they will find themselves in a better position than they are to-day. Each man here has to interpret the mandate he got from his constituents. I come from a constituency in Tír Chonaill; when I went into that constituency I went into it on the invitation of the man who was then Secretary of the Comhairle Ceanntair, and who now sits in this Dáil; I at first refused the invitation to stand because I had no desire to enter public life. When he proposed me, the Comhairle Ceanntair, he said, was in a hole, a difficulty; and he proposed me and I consented to stand for the Republic. I went into the constituency, and you, a Chinn Chomhairle, accompanied me to the first meeting; and the Chairman of the Comhairle Ceanntair took me behind the wagonette and he said he and the Comhairle Ceanntair wanted to win the election in North Donegal and that the election could be won if there was no mention of the Republic. “Very good,” said I, “you are entitled to your opinions, but you can get another candidate.” I am prepared to admit that the mandate I got from the constituents of North Donegal was one of self-determination; and it is a terrible thing and a terrible trial to have men in this Dáil interpretating that sacred principle here against the interests of the people.

        MR. GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.
        Such is life - Ned Kelly

        Comment


        • #34
          MR. O'DOHERTY: I know that the people in North Donegal at the present moment would accept this Treaty; and I think it is fair to the people of North Donegal that I should make that known; but they are accepting it under duress and at the point of the bayonet, and as a stop to terrible and immediate war. It is not peace they are getting; it is not the liberty they are getting which they are told they are getting, and they know it; and I will tell them honestly if I go to North Donegal again, what they are getting. I have my ideals of the people's will; and at this stage of the proceedings I have no intention of saying anything bitter about any man or body of men in this assembly; but I hold that the people's will was flouted in London when that document was signed. I have sufficient data for my mind to prove that the men who signed it knew that there would be a split in the Cabinet, that there would be a split in the Dáil and a split in the country, and, notwithstanding that, they accepted the document which embodies in it no clause or phrase which enables them to bring it before the people whose will they have such regard for. I say if they have the people's will, the sacred will of the Irish people, before their minds, they, at least, knowing the consequences of their signatures, should and could have demanded that if the Dáil turned it down the Irish people could have a final word. They have not done that. I am not afraid to go into my constituency and fight the question Free State versus the Irish Republic against any man, from a Cabinet Minister down; and my mind is not small enough to deny that there is a big difference between Document No. 2 and the Treaty that was signed; it is not a question of tweedledum and tweedledee, as I was told the night before this Session opened, and as I have heard repeated often since then. It is the great question of Irish sovereignty, and as long as I have a weapon to fight for that cause I shall not be a party to voting away the sovereignty of this nation (applause).

          DR. MACGINLEY: The claim is made by men who are opposing this Treaty that we have a Republic established in this country. The delegates, in signing this Treaty with England, could not vote away that Republic if we had a Republic in this country in the sense in which they mean to convey. I, as one plain man, want to know why were delegates sent to London at all? Was it to arrange for the evacuation of the English forces out of this country? Was it to arrange an alliance with England? Why were they sent to England at all? To [324] my mind the isolated Republic was let down when the reply was sent to the letter of Lloyd George to President de Valera on the 29th September, in which he stated that: “In spite of their (the British Government's) sincere desire for peace, and in spite of the conciliatory tone of your last communication, they cannot enter a conference upon the basis of this correspondence. Notwithstanding your personal assurance to the contrary which they much appreciate, it might be argued in future that the acceptance of a conference on this basis had involved them in a recognition which no British Government can accord.”

          PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I ask that my reply be read now.

          DR. MACGINLEY: The reply, no matter how carefully read—in my opinion the sending over of the delegates was an abandonment of the isolated Republic.

          PRESIDENT DE VALERA: It would be very important to have my reply read.

          MR. COLIVET: We all read the reply and we know it.

          DR. MACGINLEY: I don't want to read the reply. The point for me is this: we have not a Republic functioning in this country; we have a paper Republic; the people of Donegal are sick of this paper Republic.

          A DEPUTY: And paper Republicans, too.

          DR. MACGINLEY: If we have a Republic, how is it that the British institutions are functioning in this country as well? Every honest man in this Dáil must admit that; and are not British troops in Ireland and British institutions functioning in Ireland? We have got no national recognition from any country in the world, despite Harry Boland's talk. Their sympathy was not enough; the sympathy of the people in other countries, even in America, was not strong enough to compel them to recognise our Government. That was the test of it.

          MR. HARRY BOLAND: The people recognised it.

          DR. MACGINLEY: It might be said that our men might have got better terms in London. Perhaps they might, but I can tell you the people of Donegal, anyhow, have the very greatest confidence in the ability of Arthur Griffith and the sincerity of Michael Collins; and they believe that, taking all the circumstances of the case into account, they did what was best for Ireland. Now, President de Valera has stated that rather than sign this Treaty he was prepared to see the Irish people live in subjection until God would redeem them. I may as well say at once that that is not my creed; that is a doctrine that never was preached in the history of the world before: that a country, if it could not get absolutely what it was out for, should fight to the extermination of its people. I, as one man, can't take the responsibility for committing the men and women who sent me here to a war of extermination which, I think, would result if this Treaty were rejected. I have no qualms about the oath which I took on coming into this assembly; the people sent me here to get absolute separation if I could—I am for absolute separation if I could see a way out—but they sent me here to use my own free will; and if I could not get absolute separation at the present time I was to take something by which we could work out our own independence in the long run. I think in voting for this Treaty I am voting according to the mandate which my constituents gave me when sending me here. That is all I have to say.
          Such is life - Ned Kelly

          Comment


          • #35
            MR. THOMAS HUNTER: I rise to say a few words; perhaps if I did not do so some people might say that I had not the courage to voice my opinions in this assembly. I vote against this Treaty because I am a Republican; I was elected on the Republican ticket; I came here and took the oath to the Republican Government and I am not going now to destroy that Government. If the people do not agree with me they can get rid of me at any time and in any way that they like. Finally, as a Republican, I could never recognise the Government of George V. of England in either internal or external association.

            MR. SEAN HALES: I was not going to speak one word here in this Public Session; I spoke what I had to say in the Private Session; I don't retract [325] one word from that, nor have I one word to add to it. I have travelled down this stormy road since 1916 and it is conviction that leads me to vote for this Treaty; I know my friends and fellow-soldiers on the other side are equally convinced; but I can feel no other way out at the present moment. I did not want to make a speech; I was not going to say a word in addition to what I had said in the Private Session, but lest, as my comrade here says, that some one might say that I had not the courage of my convictions, I now state publicly that I am going to vote for this Treaty.

            MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: A Chinn Chomhairle agus a cháirde Gaedhal, mo sheana-chara, an Teachta ó Chiarruidhe Thoir, dubhairt sé i dtosach an méid cainte do dhin sé anso go raibh socair aige gan aon rud do rá a chuirfeadh fearg ar éinne. Tá socair agamsa anois gan aon rud do rá a chuirfeadh fearg ar éinne; ach tá socair agam an fhírinne d'innsint agus deir an sean-fhocal go mbíonn an fhírinne searbh; ach nuair innsim an fhírinne má chuireann sí fearg ar éinne ní hormsa atá an locht. Ní chun fearg do chur ar éinne a neosfad-sa an fhírinne anois; ní mór dom an fhírinne d'innsint mar is léir go bhfuil daoine ann ná tuigeann an scéal. Níl éinne is mó go bhfuil meas agam air imease na ndaoine atá i bhfabhar an Chonnartha so ná mo sheana-chara ó Oirthear Chiarruidhe agus mo sheana-chara ó Chontae na Gaillimhe—Piaras Béaslaí agus Pádraig O Máille. Iarrfad ortha éisteacht go cúramach le n-a bhfuil le rá agam. Dubhairt Pádraig gur mheas sé gur ghéill an t-Aire um Ghnóthaí Dúiche agus mise do Shasana sarar chuaidh an Toscaireacht anonn; is truagh ná fuil sé anso; ach dubhairt sé, agus dubhairt daoine eile atá anso, gur ghéilleamair do Shasana ag cruinniú den Aireacht le linn na cainte do bhí ar siúl idir sinne agus an cúigear do chuaidh anonn. Déanfad-sa a dheimhniú nár dhineamair agus iarfad ar Art O Gríobhtha an méíd a bheidh ráite agamsa a bhréagnú má's féidir do é. Now, my friends, there are some people who— from a few questions that they put, some of them have written them out for me—do not, apparently, understand the whole position at present. My friend, one of the Deputies from Dublin, Seán MacGarry, put a question the other night—I would have answered him, but I thought it a pity to interrupt the flow of his eloquence—he asked what would the Minister of Defence say to an ex-member of the British Army about the oath when that member would be about to join our forces—what he would say to him about the oath he had already taken to England. The only oath that concerns me is the Oath of Allegiance to the Dáil, and as long as every member of the army abides by the oath which he must take when he enters it I am satisfied; if he does not abide by it, as long as I am at the head of the army, I will have him dealt with in the proper way. My friend, the Deputy for one of the Mayo constituencies, sent a question in here which, in effect, is this: If the Minister of Defence had been made an offer two months ago to have the British forces clear out of Ireland would he, instead of accepting that offer, say: “No! I prefer to drive them out.”? That, I understand, was in effect the question. Certainly not, I would let them go out; I do not want any fighting unless it is absolutely necessary; but if the conditions were that our people must become British subjects I would say: “I am not going to agree to that; clear out if you like.” A Deputy from Tipperary and Waterford, one of my own colleagues, has sent me in a question which I will read. “In view of the fact that many members and several people are biassed in favour of this proposed Treaty because the Minister of Finance is in favour of ratification, and in view of the fact that many of these people, and many of these members, are of opinion that Mr. Michael Collins is a leader of the army and has fought many fights for the Republic, I think it is of great importance that an authoritative statement be made (a) defining the real position Mr. Michael Collins held in the army, (b) telling what fights he has taken an active part in, provided this can be done without injustice to himself or danger to the country; or can it be authoritatively stated that he ever fired a shot at any enemy of Ireland?”

            MR. MILROY: Is that in order?

            MR. M. COLLINS: Carry on.
            Such is life - Ned Kelly

            Comment


            • #36
              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: That is a matter which I approach with great reluctance; and I may tell you I would [326] never have dealt with it, and this question would never have been asked, but for the statement made by the Chairman of the Delegation when he was speaking here; he referred to Mr. Michael Collins as the man who won the war.

              MR. GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.

              MR. FIONAN LYNCH: So he did.

              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: And the war is won and we are talking here. Very well, I will explain to you how that is done.

              MR. M. COLLINS: I would like to rise to a point of order. Are we discussing the Treaty or are we discussing the Minister of Finance? I think we are discussing the Treaty.

              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: The Minister of Finance does not like what I have got to say.

              MR. M. COLLINS: Anything that can be said about me, say it.

              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Tá go maith.

              MR. BRENNAN: If things are to be said about the Minister of Finance are we at liberty to say anything we know about other people? I mean it is becoming personal.

              MR. J.J. WALSH: I think Cathal Brugha ought to respect the chair.

              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Táim chun rud éigin le rá anois; tá san socair im' aigne agam, agus má chuirtear isteach orm táim canncarach, crosta, agus ní aingeal in aon chor mé.

              MR. M. COLLINS: Ní chuirfeadh éinne é sin id' leith.

              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: It is necessary for me to define Michael Collins' position in the army. Now, I have my department divided up into sections. I have the ordinary Ministerial part of it; the civil part of it; the liaison part of it; and then the Head Quarters Staff. The Head Quarters Staff is divided up again; at the head is the Chief of Staff; and at the head of each section of the Head Quarters Staff is another man working under the Chief of Staff. One of those heads of the subsections is Mr. Michael Collins; and to use a word which he has on more than one occasion used, and which he is fond of using, he is merely a subordinate in the Department of Defence.

              MR. DOLAN: Has he been an efficient officer?

              MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Leig dom anois agus neosfad san duit. While the war was in progress I could not praise too highly the work done by the Head Quarters' Staff. The Chief of Staff and each of the leaders of the subsections—the members of the Head Quarters' Staff—were the best men we could get for the positions; each of them carried out efficiently, so far as I know, the work that was entrusted to him they worked conscientiously and patriotically for Ireland without seeking any notoriety, with one exception; whether he is responsible or not for the notoriety I am not going to say (cries of “Shame” and “Get on with the Treaty”). There is little more for me to say. One member was specially selected by the Press and the people to put him into a position which he never held; he was made a romantic figure, a mystical character such as this person certainly is not; the gentleman I refer to is Mr. Michael Collins——

              MR. DUGGAN: The Irish people will judge that.
              Such is life - Ned Kelly

              Comment


              • #37
                MR. MILROY: Now we know things.

                MR. DAN MACCARTHY: Now we know the reason for the opposition to the Treaty (applause).

                MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: During the war, on one or two occasions, people came to me and asked me why I did not stop this kind of thing; here was a man being described as Commander-in-Chief of the Irish Army, and on another occasion he was Field-Marshal-General, I believe. My reply was that Mr. Michael Collins could not be responsible for what people said of him in the Press: and consequently I never took any notice of these things, and would not have done so only for what the Chairman of the Delegation said; because it seems to me, when the Chairman of the [327] Delegation made such a statement as that, the people who were whispering fairy tales into the ears of the Press correspondents must have been at the Chairman of the Delegation too—that Mr. Michael Collins had won the war.

                MR. GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.

                MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: The Chairman of the Delegation thinks the war is won, so far as he could win it, for England.

                MR. GRIFFITH: Bravo, Cathal, bravo.

                MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Go maith. Now, so much for what the Chairman of the Delegation said about Mr. Michael Collins; but when Mr. Michael Collins was speaking here in support of the resolution in favour of the Treaty, he told us that during the war he compelled respect and also during the negotiations.

                MR. GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.

                MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Well, the modesty of that is such that I will not spoil it by comment; but it is just a continuance of the other fable. He also referred to some mysterious incidents that he says the people were excommunicated for, and he said he was responsible for that; a lot of people applauded it; and I wonder what those people who applauded thought they were applauding. I know of only two instances for which people during the war were excommunicated; one was an ambush, it was a fair ambush, and in charity to Mr. Michael Collins I will not repeat here what a participant in the ambush said about Mr. Collins. His remark about his being responsible for it—if it was to that he referred—suffice it to say——

                MR. COLIVET: I respectfully suggest that the Minister for Defence——

                MR. SEAN MACGARRY: Too late. Let him carry on now.

                MR. BRENNAN: The damage has been done.

                MR. M. COLLINS: No damage is done.

                DR. MACCARTAN: The damage is done.

                MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: In any case you all understand now——

                MR. J. MACGRATH: We don't.
                Such is life - Ned Kelly

                Comment


                • #38
                  MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Well, what exactly am I going to say to you? (Laughter). That Mr. Michael Collins does not occupy that position in the army that newspaper men said he occupied.

                  MR. MACGRATH: I never thought he did.

                  MR. SEAN MACGARRY: I think we have enough.

                  MR. DAN MACCARTHY: I must protest against the Minister of Defence being interrupted. He is making a good speech for the Treaty (applause).

                  MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Deimhneochad é sin ar ball. Now, I finish with that, so far as Michael Collins is concerned. Now, in the article which appeared a few days ago in the Freeman's Journal, the one in which a most dastardly attack was made on our President and on Deputy Childers, Mr. Michael Collins was also referred to; and it was stated that when our President was arrested and released there was a reward of ten thousand pounds offered by the British Government for the corpse of Michael Collins.

                  MR. GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.

                  MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I wonder how the Freeman's Journal got that information?

                  MR. GRIFFITH: Public notoriety.

                  MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Because it is not in accordance with the tale that was being circulated at the time by a very intimate friend of Mr. Michael Collins. He told it to me, and I asked him where he got it, and he said he got it from Mr. Michael Collins himself, and he told him that it was forty thousand pounds.

                  MR. J.J. WALSH: He was worth it.

                  [328]MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Now, Deputy Childers was attacked in the same article, and you know the way he was attacked. It is only fair for me to say now that I know, of my own personal knowledge, that Deputy Childers, amongst other work that he did for Ireland, has done as much as most men, and more than nearly all men who are working for Ireland, to arm the people of Ireland. I will turn now to what was said—some of the nice things that the Deputy for Tyrone, Seán Milroy, said —about the Minister for Defence; he said, amongst other things, that the Minister for Defence did not want peace. Now, I don't like to refer to anything that was said by a member of this House as being nonsense; but I ask you this: does any man contemplate with equanimity a renewal of the conditions in this country in which his wife will be dragged in the dead of the night out of her house, hustled along through the garden, and put into a motor lorry, and kept there in order that she will not be present while her husband is being murdered if the English cut-throats can get him? Does any man look forward with pleasure to having his little children frightened out of their lives by the spectacle of armed men rushing in and running through the house, some of them breaking their way down through the ceilings? But apparently the Minister of Defence does not want peace, but prefers that kind of thing. I am against this resolution because I know this Treaty can't achieve peace. You know how those who are opposed to it, how keenly they feel the thing, and how much they are against it; but some of the best men on the other side, the men who count, some of the fighting men, have said that the reason that they are in favour of it is that they will be able to get in arms. Deputy J.J. Walsh told us the other day—and he is in favour of this Treaty— that if he got a rifle and ammunition each time he would take this oath that he would keep on taking it.

                  MR. J.J. WALSH: Hear, hear; I would.

                  MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: And what is Deputy J.J. Walsh going to do with the rifle?
                  Such is life - Ned Kelly

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    MR. J.J. WALSH: What I did before. I said I would take indefinite oaths for indefinite rifles and ammunition. I stand over what I said.

                    MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Yes; and this gentleman is in favour of the Treaty. Now, we are told that this Treaty, if passed, is going to achieve peace. Well, when people who are in favour of the Treaty are going to get rifles, and take oaths to get rifles, and going to make use of them, we will say that we have little to say against this Treaty but to answer where will the peace come in? And it is because I know that you are not going to have peace that I am against the Treaty. Now, another statement made by this gentleman, the Deputy from Tyrone; he said he was taking off the gloves; he said that he had let the cat out of the bag when he made reference to the oath. Now, it is in keeping with some of the tactics referred to by our President yesterday that this use should be made of an alleged oath, a second oath. Mr. Deputy Milroy could only have heard about the discussion on that oath from some member of the Cabinet, because there was absolutely no note taken of it, because there was no decision come to on that oath. Our friends on the opposite side now know that since the start of these negotiations on all vital matters we found it necessary to have unanimity in the Cabinet; and when we found we could not have unanimity the particular matter was dropped. Now, this oath question came up before us and it was clear from what was said that we could not have unanimity on it. Therefore, so far as the Cabinet was concerned, it was dropped; and the President, so far as my recollection went, said something to the effect that, if nothing else was between us, he would be in favour of taking a certain oath and he spoke out some words. However, that was only his own personal opinion; so far as the Cabinet were concerned there could not be unanimity; and it was dropped. The ungloved orator from Tyrone said he let the cat out of the bag when he made reference to the oath.

                    MR. MILROY: The oath is on the Cabinet minutes.

                    MADAME MARKIEVICZ: There are no records.

                    [329]MR. MILROY: There is such an oath on the Cabinet records.

                    MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: There was no such oath agreed to by the Cabinet; and anybody who knows anything about it knows that. This Deputy from Tyrone made another very personal remark to which I will not refer here as it is beneath contempt; consequently I will take no further notice of it. I will now turn to the Deputy from Offaly; he told us that the Republic was betrayed; he said it was betrayed when we decided to send delegates to England; nevertheless this delegate was present at the meeting of the Dáil at which this decision was come to and he sat silently by and he allowed us to betray the Republic. Of course you all know, everybody with the exception of this Deputy, that by sending delegates across to London the Republic was not betrayed. This Deputy also said that the Republic was dead. Well, I tell him that if it depended upon faint hearts to keep it alive it would have died long ago, and if it depended upon faint hearts to bring it into existence it would never have been born. He tells us he will not vote for it or against it; that's a nice position for a man who has taken upon himself a certain responsibility— that's a nice position for him to adopt. Now, this Deputy and another Deputy, the Assistant Minister for Local Government, both took it upon themselves to speak for the army—as to the condition it was in and what would happen. They are both men of military age, and when they make a closer acquaintanceship with the army by joining its ranks, and putting themselves into the position of fighting, they may earn the respect of military men; and if their merits ever raise them to the position in which they would be entitled to speak for the army, I hope they will have learned sufficient sense then to keep silent about army matters when it is not necessary to refer to them. We come now to the jocular gentleman who represents Kilkenny; were I in the vein I might follow his jokes. However, I am not in that mood; but I suggest to him that this is too serious a matter to be dealt with by flippancy and levity. Now, the Deputy for South Kerry, Fionán O Loingsigh, stated here that he spoke for the people of South Kerry.

                    MR. FIONAN LYNCH: And I still maintain it.

                    MR. BRUGHA: There was an interjection from the body of the House telling him “No!” and he answered: “Yes, a minority of one.” I had in my pocket at the time, only I did not wish to interrupt him—just the same as on the contrary he has again now tried to interrupt me—I had in my pocket——

                    MR. FIONAN LYNCH: If you use personalities you will be interrupted.

                    MR. BRUGHA: I had in my pocket a document signed by people who are entitled to speak for the young men, the fighting men, the men who count and who are ready to make sacrifices in his constituency, and that is the Brigáde Commandant in his area—the two Brigade Commandants that cover the area in which his constituency is in. In this they say very respectfully to the Government that they are absolutely against the Treaty. Since Deputy Lynch has made that statement he has been repudiated in the papers.

                    MR. LYNCH: Oh!
                    Such is life - Ned Kelly

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      MR. BRUGHA: I will come now to the distinguished Chairman of the Delegation; and I don't refer to him sarcastically as the distinguished Chairman of the Delegation, for I, as much as anyone in this House, appreciate the political sagacity and patriotism of the Chairman of the Delegation; and I considered he was an acquisition, too, when those who were called the physical force movement joined with him four years ago. I considered it was an acquisition to have such a man with us. Now, he has said he has been a student of Thomas Davis all his life. So was I; but I take different lessons from the teaching of Davis; and I must remind him that when Davis wrote it was for an Ireland enslaved and demoralised after forty years of the Union; but, anyway, those of you who saw the first edition of the new paper, the Republic of Ireland, saw the quotation in it from Davis in which he says: “in a just cause a nation is justified in going to war.” Now, I will defy the Chairman of the Delegation to point out to me in any readings of Thomas Davis where he advocated the sacrifice of principle in favour of expediency. In the Secret Session, in some interchanges that there were between Arthur Griffith and [330] myself, he asked me to repeat at the Public Session the answer that I gave to him at a Cabinet meeting that was held on the Saturday before the plenipotentiaries went away to England for the last time; and he told us at that Cabinet meeting that he would not break on the Crown. There were some rather heated passages between us and he put the question to me: Could I, or could we, could I with the army which we had here in Ireland, drive the English forces out—I am not exactly certain if he added something about the navy. I answered that I could not undertake to do anything of the kind; I did not think it was necessary; and I do not think it is necessary for us to be able to beat all the resources in the shape of an army that England can put into Ireland in order to maintain our independence. We maintained it when we had not an army at all; it is not necessary. Now, Mr. Griffith has referred to the difference between this Treaty of his and the alternative that we have as being only a quibble; and yet the English Government is going to make war, as they say they will, for a quibble. The difference is, to me, the difference that there is between a draught of water and a draught of poison. If I were to accept this Treaty and if I did not do my best to have it defeated I would, in my view, be committing national suicide; I would be breaking the national tradition that has been handed down to us through the centuries. We would be doing for the first time a thing that no generation ever thought of doing before—wilfully, voluntarily admitting ourselves to be British subjects, and taking the oath of allegiance voluntarily to the English King. Now, I hope it is admitted by everybody in favour of this Treaty that that oath constitutes an Oath of Allegiance to the English King (“No! no!”). Well, then, it is not admitted (“No! no!”). Well, I will prove that it is; it has been proved before and I thought that was sufficient.

                      MR. DUGGAN: It was not proved.

                      MR. BRUGHA: You swear to bear true allegiance to the Constitution of the Free State of Ireland as by law established; that is, in itself, if there was not a word about the King to follow, and there is—that, in itself, would be an Oath of Allegiance to the English King, because he would be the head of that Constitution. Agus tá sé sin maith a dhóthain. Now, the third objectionable feature, the fundamental thing, even if there was no question of becoming British subjects and taking the Oath of Allegiance, this third objection would be so fundamental that I say it would be equivalent to my taking poison if I accepted it: that was allowing the British to say to us, “We will not allow you to carry out your coastal defence, you will not have permission to do so until we are satisfied, we must first agree to it.” That is putting us in a humiliating position. Now, no matter what happens we would not agree to the Treaty in which these three fundamentals are included. There has been a body of opinion in this country, as I had occasion to write a week ago in Irish, that has always repudiated English authority in this country. Each generation had that body of opinion in it, and whenever they found themselves strong enough they went out in insurrection against England and English authority here. The last one, as you know, was in 1916 when we established our Republic; it was ratified in January, 1919, and we have carried on our functions with a de jure and de facto Government since; and here, when we are in so strong a position and we so strong and England so weak and with so many enemies as she has now more than ever, we are asked to do such a thing as this. Why, if instead of being so strong, our last cartridge had been fired, our last shilling had been spent, and our last man were lying on the ground and his enemies howling round him and their bayonets raised, ready to plunge them into his body, that man should say—true to the traditions handed down—if they said to him: “Now, will you come into our Empire?”—he should say, and he would say: “No! I will not.” That is the spirit that has lasted all through the centuries, and you people in favour of the Treaty know that the British Government and the British Empire will have gone down before that spirit dies out in Ireland. Now, how are we going to reconcile an agreement between the people who have that spirit in them and those who are in favour of the Treaty. We have in this alternative of ours the means of doing this. Now, seeing that some people are in doubt as to what our alternative is, [331] especially one man for whom I have great respect—though, unfortunately, he made an error in a statement he made in his speech—who said our alternative had not been treated fairly and that he did not understand it—that is, Deputy Mulcahy—I presume that those in favour of the Treaty have no objection to my explaining briefly what our alternative means. We are prepared to enter into an agreement, an association with the British Commonwealth of Nations as it is generally called, on the same or similar lines as that on which one business firm enters into combination with another or several others. The thing is not uncommon now; such combinations are made for certain specific purposes; the combination appoints a managing-director to carry out the business of the firm, but it is only for a specific purpose; each firm remains independent except for this one particular business. Say the purpose would be to do foreign trade; each firm would carry on, independently, its own internal trade; and the combination would, under this managing-director, carry out its purpose for foreign trade; each firm would give a stipend to the managing-director. Now, by entering into combination no firm sacrifices its independence as a firm. We are prepared, on the same terms, to enter into an association with the British Commonwealth of Nations, and for the purposes of that combination we are prepared to recognise the English Government as the head of the combination (cries of “Oh!”).

                      MR. GRIFFITH: A managing-director.

                      MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Now, by entering into such arrangements we are not going into the British Empire; neither do we take any oath whatsoever; and there will be no representative of the British Crown in the shape of a Governor-General in Ireland. We are entering into that arrangement, into this association as external associates. Now, what does that mean?

                      MR. GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.
                      Such is life - Ned Kelly

                      Comment


                      • #41
                        MR. BRUGHA: Tá go maith Ní thuigean tú anois é do réir dheallramh. Míneochad duit é. Now, instead of becoming British subjects or British citizens we will have reciprocal citizenship, that is, an Irish citizen or British subject will have the support of this group in any part of the world where he may find himself where he will require help. He will have the power of the new group behind him.

                        MR. GRIFFITH: Common citizenship.

                        MR. BRUGHA: Reciprocal citizenship. Apparently the Chairman of the Delegation does not understand the difference between common citizenship and reciprocal citizenship. Common citizenship will mean that we are British subjects, and reciprocal citizenship will mean that we will remain Irish Republicans. There is no letting down the Irish Republic there, and I defy the Chairman of the Delegation, when he is speaking after me, or anybody else after him, on any platform in Ireland, to prove that we have deviated by one hair's breadth from the Republican position by making such a proposal. Now, one of the greatest fears that the British Government have from the Irish people is, that at any time they would be in a position, were England at war, to interfere with the food supplies of the population of Great Britain; they must safeguard the food supplies of forty millions of people; we appreciate that fear, and we realise how necessary it is for them to safeguard the food supplies of the English people. Consequently, we are prepared to agree not to build submarines unless in agreement with the British Government; the only use that submarines would be to us would be to attack English transports or food ships if England were at war; they would not be of very much use to us. Now, we are willing to give England that safeguard that we will not attack her foodships, and that we will not put ourselves in the position to do so. We are prepared to give her certain facilities in our ports for a period of five years; and at that time, or any other time, that we here consider that we are in a position to carry out our own coastal defence, then we take it over; but for five years we give her certain facilities in our ports. Those are fundamentals. There are other details which appear in our proposals, but it is not necessary for me now to go into them. The things that really matter are the fundamentals; upon these fundamentals we can make a free [332] peace with England. Now, why can we not be unanimous in this matter. So far as I can see, at the start when this document was signed there was only one man really in favour of it and that was the Chairman of the Delegation; there might have been a couple of others favouring it, but the man who really wanted it was the Chairman. Our President yesterday narrated to you a little modern history; I will supplement what he said; and I might say that when he spoke before—early in this Session—before Christmas, he stated that if Arthur Griffith had told the electors of East Cavan that he was not going to stand by the principles that were enunciated by the speakers at that election, that he would not have been elected. I tell Mr. Griffith that only for a certain arrangement that he made in 1917, that he would not be now in public life any more than he was in 1916. I have here the Sinn Féin Constitution as passed by the Ard-Fheis held in October, 1917; there is a clause in this resolution which took us three nights to get passed—to get Mr. Griffith to agree to it—this is the Clause: “Sinn Féin aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic.” Mr. Griffith objected to that, but eventually we came to an agreement by adding this: “Having achieved that status the Irish people may by referendum freely choose their own form of Government.” These are the vital clauses in the Constitution of the Sinn Féin movement. In that Constitution we forged the weapon by which we produced the Dáil.
                        Such is life - Ned Kelly

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          If Mr. Griffith had not agreed to that, and it took him three nights before he would agree, I say he would not be in public life to-day any more than he was before 1916. Mr. Griffith, in 1916, was in prison for some time; he was released in 1917; we came together some months before that Ard-Fheis—and Mr. Griffith himself, now this is some modern history, will correct me if I make a mistake —Count Plunkett held a conference in 1917 and, as a result of that Conference, there was a Committee brought into being to form a new political party; I was asked to go on that Committee; I had never been in politics before; the work that I had done, so far as I was able to do work for Ireland, was, in addition to my little efforts to revive the language, preparing for Easter Week for years before. Now, I consented to go into this, to go on that Committee that had been selected, with Mr. Griffith. I put the question to him: “Suppose the League of Nations agrees that Ireland should be independent, and that England should say ‘I will not give her her independence,’ would you then,” said I to Mr. Griffith, “would you then be against our going out and fighting?” And he said: “No! I will not.”“Very well, then, we will,” said I, “go into it, and the fighting men will go into it, and the men who are prepared to make sacrifices will go into it, too.” If he did not give that undertaking, we would have to form Republican Clubs; he gave the undertaking, and then agreed to that Constitution. Now, instead of abiding by that, Mr. Griffith has come back from England with this Treaty; instead of abiding by this which he undertook—we see that instead of the Republic he brings back that Treaty. He tells us now the war is won. The men who are prepared to make sacrifices would never have come into this movement; they would have formed a party of their own. Mr. Griffith's policy was a well-thought out policy, but it would not work; we know what little progress it made until 1916; but for these men who have been with us in every generation that policy would never have succeeded. It was the fact of these men working with their own ideals and on that policy, it was only on that fact that we were able to bring the Dail into existence, and function as a Government; though not recognised it is, de facto and de jure, the Government; it is that up to now and, please God, it will remain so. Now, why can we not regain the position that we held prior to the signing of the Treaty? It can be done if Mr. Griffith, for one, will consent to it—I may tell you that. A lot of you Teachtaí, already know that I was against ever sending men across to England; not that I considered that we were giving the Republic away by doing so, but that I knew the terrible influences that would be brought to bear upon them there—influences that I thought might be too much for them— but I hoped, especially when there were certain instructions drawn up, that the influences would not be too strong to get the better of them, and that they would abide by those instructions that were drawn up for them and to which they consented before they went. I, at [333] any rate, was against these negotiations because I considered they were part of a manœuvre on the part of Lloyd George to get the better of us; Mr. Lloyd George, in the autumn of 1920, told us at Carnarvon, and told the world, that he had murder by the throat in Ireland; and he told us what he was going to do with us. He had no sooner made that declaration than his Black-and-Tanism and militarism started here in the country; it was not long after when he had Balbriggan sacked, the people taken out of their houses and murdered; the revered pastor of that parish in a public statement said that the two men who were murdered presented the appearance of people who had been done to death by wild animals instead of human beings. This campaign of terrorism went on round the country; there is no necessity for me to go into details; one of the worst—worse even than Balbriggan— was the massacre at Kerry Pike, outside Cork, in which six men who had surrendered were done to death; during the inquest the bodies of some of them had to be kept covered so that the way that they were mutilated would not be exhibited; these men were under torture before they were killed for two or three hours. In spite of all that terrorism Lloyd George could not beat the Irish nation, and when he found he could not do so, he resorted to wiles and manœuvres; he came along with the suggestion of negotiations. Now, we agreed to send our delegates. As I have said, and as has been said already here on a few occasions, certain instructions were drawn up to which they agreed, one of which was that they were not to come to any decision without notifying us here the remainder of the Cabinet at home here—and waiting for the answer from us; another was that they were not to sign any Treaty without first submitting it to us. You know how these instructions have been carried out. I may tell you that when the negotiations were about a month in progress some of us became very suspicious when we saw what was going on; we found that the five men, the five delegates, the team of five that we had selected, was being divided up; that two members of it, and two only, were being brought into what they called a sub-plenary conference. For more than a month before the signing of this Treaty there was, I think, something between fifteen and twenty sub-conferences. Our team of five men was divided up and only two consulted when important things, the vital things were discussed; there was not even a secretary allowed to be present. Some of us became suspicious; I did; I became very suspicious and I drew attention to this. I was told that there were certain instructions given to them, and surely there was no use in causing friction by supposing that they would not abide by those instructions; consequently I was satisfied. Now, they came back on that fateful Saturday. When Mr. Griffith told us that he would not break on the Crown I made what he might consider some rather heated remarks; I asked how it was that our team of five had been divided up? Who was responsible for it? His answer was—the British Government; the British Government had divided up our team. I asked him who was it that selected the two particular members— the two particular members were Mr. Griffith himself and Mr. Michael Collins —who was it that selected them? What was his answer? The British Government. I then made an answer which he insisted should be put down on the minutes, and I said: “Yes, the British Government selected their men.” In saying that I did not mean to cast any reflection on the honour of those men; but before these men were selected at all I told them—at the Cabinet meeting at which their names were suggested to be put before the Dáil—I told them what I thought of their ideals of freedom from the utterances that I had heard from them; and I said at this Cabinet meeting on that fateful Saturday: “Yes, they selected their men.” My meaning was this: because they knew they were the two weakest men we had on the team; and Lloyd George and his friends pretty soon discovered that; and that is how they came to select them out of the five; and they allowed the British Government to divide them up and select their own men to carry on an important Conference with them.
                          Such is life - Ned Kelly

                          Comment


                          • #43
                            They had the thing, apparently, settled with these men and they knew what they would agree to; and until the last hour they did not call in the other two men; when they intimidated—on the admission of the other two—the other two men into it. As far as the third man is concerned I will make no reference to him whatsoever; I prefer [334] not—charity above all things. In any case you see the result—you see the result of this manœuvre. Negotiations were suggested after terrorism had failed; they find out who are the weakest and they select them to carry on important negotiations; and they intimidate the other two, and then there is this Treaty. No wonder there was jubilation in London when it was signed, and congratulations from the English King to Lloyd George. This was the end of the fight, and Ireland, at least so far as these men could help it, anyway, had consented to go into the British Empire. Now, I hope that you members of the Dáil will see through this manœuvre of Lloyd George, and that you will not consent to be a party to it. I put it up now to the five men, the five members of this Delegation, that they are not to vote at all for this Treaty. They gave a certain undertaking to Lloyd George and his friends when they signed that they would recommend; that undertaking went no further, and in honour they need not go any further; and this is such a vital matter that I think it should not be necessary for them to go out of their way by voting for it. I put it up to them that they should leave it to the Dáil— that they should not vote for it; and I put it up to you, members of the Dáil, that you ought not to allow yourselves to fall into the trap that was laid for Ireland by Lloyd George, and that you should not fall into it. Finally, I put it up to Mr. Arthur Griffith to fall in with this course; and I tell Mr. Arthur Griffith that when in 1917, at the Ard-Fheis, he stepped down in favour of Eamonn de Valera as President of the Sinn Féin Organisation of which he had been head since its inception—certainly for years— I tell Mr. Griffith that when he did that, he earned the respect of men to whom his name, prior to that, was no more than the name of any other man. However, when he did that, and since that, these men have respect for Arthur Griffith second only to Eamon de Valera. If Arthur Griffith will fall in with this suggestion now I tell him—and I need not take upon myself to be a prophet to foretell it—I tell him if he does this his name will live for ever in Ireland (applause).

                            MR. M. COLLINS: A Chinn Chomhairle, I crave your leave to make just one personal reference. It has been suggested by the Minister for Defence that I, in my statement, said I was responsible for a certain ambush. I did not say that, sir; I said I took responsibility for a certain incident; I took that responsibility as a member of the Government.

                            The House adjourned for tea at 6.25 p.m., and resumed at 7.15 p.m., with the SPEAKER (DR. MACNEILL) in the Chair.

                            MR. AUSTIN STACK: With your permission I wish to raise one small point; the front public bench was reserved for the members of the Standing Committee of Sinn Féin; a member of the Standing Committee who came in and took his seat there a while ago was ejected to make room for a person who is not a member of the Standing Committee; and the member, the gentleman who was ejected from his seat, has left his seat under protest. I think the seat should be vacated and he should be invited in.

                            THE SPEAKER: Give instructions to the officer in charge of the door.

                            MR. STACK: Call in Mr. Little.
                            Such is life - Ned Kelly

                            Comment


                            • #44
                              MR. HARRY BOLAND: Immediately following my speech to-day my colleague, Mr. MacGrath, thought fit to bring a personal conversation into the debate; and in order to clear my record I will take this opportunity to state that I was the servant of this Government, representing it in America, and when I was recalled to Ireland on the peace discussion I was informed by the President that the very minimum would be external association. I was instructed to go back to America with this definite objective in view; and I made whatever provision was possible, so that in the event of Ireland's minimum being accepted we would have no trouble from our friends in America. Now, with that in view, on the Tuesday night on which the Treaty was signed in London I stepped off the train at Washington, and when I read that the Treaty had been signed I understood that the men who went to negotiate for Ireland had followed out the instructions of their Cabinet, and that the minimum [335] had been achieved. I thereupon issued a statement in which I said that Ireland had come within the comity of nations. On the following morning, Wednesday morning, the Treaty ap-appeared in the American Press; and when I read the terms of the Treaty I was opposed to it. On the following Thursday night Mr. Stephen O'Mara, the fiscal agent to this Government, and myself attended a meeting in Washington where invitations had been sent out to wealthy Americans inviting them to subscribe to a million dollar Bond Drive for the Republic; and the men turned up, and we cancelled the Bond Drive, and they turned the meeting into a meeting of rejoicings. Senators were present and they sang hallelujahs; and I, myself, spoke against that Treaty. On the following morning my speech was reported in the Manchester Guardian because their representative in America was among the invited guests; that was on record five hours before President de Valera came out against the Treaty. Apart from the propriety of introducing a private conversation I find it necessary to make a personal explanation; I certainly hope we won't reproduce any more private conversations.

                              MR. M. COLLINS: You cannot stand them, Harry, you stood for the Treaty first. (“Order, order.”)

                              MR. HARRY BOLAND: No! and you know it, Michael (laughter).
                              Such is life - Ned Kelly

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                              • #45
                                MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH: I cannot accept the invitation of the Minister of Defence to dishonour my signature and become immortalised in Irish history. I have signed this Treaty; and the man or nation that dishonours its signature is dishonoured for ever; no man who signed that Treaty can dishonour his signature without dishonouring himself and the nation (applause). As to what the Minister of Defence said about myself I have nothing to say; it may be that I was unknown in public life before 1916; and it may be that I am only known in public life since through the Minister of Defence. That is not a matter I am interested in. There is one thing I want to say; a suggestion was made that my colleagues and myself are going to be immortalised if I take a certain course—to dishonour my signature and the nation. It was said that I was a weak man in the negotiations in London, and that I and that my colleague and friend, Michael Collins, held back our conversations with the English Ministers and gave something away. We were asked why we went to see these Ministers without the full body of the plenipotentiaries? For the same reason that President de Valera met Lloyd George alone when he went to London; and because there are certian things that are better discussed by two or three men than by eighteen men; and we both agreed on that. One other reference will I make to what the Minister of Defence has said; he spoke of Michael Collins; he referred to what I said about Michael Collins —that he was the man who won the war. I said it, and I say it again; he was the man that made the situation; he was the man, and nobody knows better than I do how, during a year and a half he worked from six in the morning until two next morning. He was the man whose matchless energy, whose indomitable will carried Ireland through the terrible crisis (applause); and though I have not now, and never had, an ambition about either political affairs or history, if my name is to go down in history I want it associated with the name of Michael Collins (applause). Michael Collins was the man who fought the Black-and-Tan terror for twelve months, until England was forced to offer terms (cheers). That is all I have to say on that subject. Now, we have been in London as plenipotentiaries, and when we were going across it was stated to us that there might be scape-goats, and I said I was prepared to be a scapegoat if one per cent. more could be got for the Irish nation. We came back. We thought, at all events, we had done something that was very good for the Irish nation. We were indicted here from the day we came back; we were told that we let down the Republic; and the Irish people were led to believe that we had gone there with a mandate to get a Republic and nothing but a Republic, and that we had violated that mandate. Sir, before I went to London I said at a Cabinet meeting—when every member of the Cabinet was there—that: “If I go to London I can't get a Republic; I will try for a Republic, but I can't bring it back.” And we tried for a Republic, though I knew we could not get it. One Deputy here said yesterday that we were guilty of treason against [336] the Republic. Well, if we were guilty of treason against the Republic let us be tried for treason. I, at all events, have nothing on my conscience; what I did, I did for the best interests of Ireland; I believed I was doing right; I believe now I did right, and I would do the same thing again (cheers). Now, we have been told, and we were told after we came back, that we were in violent conflict with what the Irish people had expressed in the three elections; very well. The documents and letters that passed between our President and the Premier of England are all before the public; in which one of them was a demand made for the recognition of the Irish Republic as a condition before we went to London? If we were to get a Republic, and nothing but a Republic, the thing could have been dismissed in six lines by writing to the Premier of England and telling him that we would meet him on the condition that he recognised the Republic. We were sent to make some compromise, bargain or arrangement; we made an arrangement; the arrangement we made is not satisfactory to many people. Let them criticise on that point, but do not let them say that we were sent to get one thing and that we got something else. We got a different type of arrangement from that which many wished; but when they charge us or insinuate that we went there with a mandate to demand a Republic, and nothing but a Republic, then they are maligning us; if we got that mandate we would have finished up in five minutes in Downing Street. Now, after the General Election, at a meeting of the Dáil in August last, President de Valera made a speech which covered the ground on which we went there; he said, speaking on the General Election: “I don't take it that the answer was for a form of Republican Government as such, because we are not Republican doctrinaires as such; but it was for Irish freedom and Irish independence.” (Hear, hear). We went there to London, not as Republican doctrinaires, but looking for the substance of freedom and independence. If you think what we brought back is not the substance of independence that is a legitimate ground for attack upon us, but to attack us on the ground that we went there to get a Republic is to attack us on false and lying grounds; and some of those who criticise on that ground know perfectly well the conditions under which we went. “We are ready,” said President de Valera—“We are ready,” he said—“to leave the whole question between Ireland and England to external arbitration.” What did that mean? Need I comment on it? Is that saying you will have a Republic and nothing but a Republic. Is not that that America or any other country might decide between us whether we would have a Republic or not?

                                PRESIDENT DE VALERA: By justice.
                                Such is life - Ned Kelly

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